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Abstract—We present a comprehensive view of the relations
among several privacy notions: differential privacy (DP) [1],
Bayesian differential privacy (BDP) [2], semantic privacy (SP) [3],
and membership privacy (MP) [4]. The results are organized
into two parts. In part one, we extend the notion of semantic
privacy (SP) to Bayesian semantic privacy (BSP) and show its
essential equivalence with Bayesian differential privacy (BDP)
in the quantitative sense. We prove the relations between
BDP, BSP, and SP as follows: ǫ-BDP ⇐=
(
1
2
−
1
e
ǫ+1
)
-BSP, and
ǫ-BDP =⇒ (e2ǫ − 1)-BSP =⇒ (e2ǫ − 1)-SP. In addition, we obtain a
minor result ǫ-DP ⇐=
(
1
2
− 1
e
ǫ+1
)
-SP, which improves the result of
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] stating ǫ-DP⇐= ǫ/6-SP for ǫ ≤ 1.35.
In part two, we establish the relations between BDP and MP. First,
ǫ-BDP =⇒ ǫ-MP. Second, for a family of distributions that are
downward scalable in the sense of Li et al. [4], it is shown that
ǫ-BDP ⇐= ǫ-MP.
Keywords—Differential privacy, Bayesian differential privacy,
semantic privacy, membership privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy (DP). Differential privacy by
Dwork et al. [1], [5] is a robust privacy standard that has
been successfully applied to a range of data analysis tasks, since
it provides a rigorous foundation for defining and preserving
privacy. Differential privacy has received considerable attention
in the literature [6]–[15]. Apple has incorporated differential
privacy into its mobile operating system iOS 10 [16]. Google
has implemented a differentially private tool called RAPPOR in
the Chrome browser to collect information about clients [17].
A randomized algorithm Y satisfies ǫ-differentially privacy
if for all adjacent databases x, x′ and any event E, it holds
that P[Y (x) ∈ E] ≤ eǫP[Y (x′) ∈ E], where P[·] denotes the
probability throughout this paper. Intuitively, under differential
privacy, an adversary given access to the output do not have
much confidence to determine whether it was sampled from the
probability distribution generated by the algorithm when the
database is x or when the database is x′.
Bayesian differential privacy (BDP). Yang et al. [2] in-
troduce the notion of Bayesian differential privacy as follows.
Bayesian differential privacy broadens the application scenarios
of differential privacy when data records have dependencies. For
a database x with n tuples, let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be a tuple index
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in the database and S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ i be a tuple index set.
An adversary denoted by A(i,S) knows the values of all tuples
in S (denoted by xS ) and attempts to attack the value of tuple
i (denoted by xi). For a randomized perturbation mechanism
Y = P[y ∈ Y | x] on database x, the Bayesian differential privacy
leakage (BDPL) of Y with respect to the adversary A(i,S) is
BDPLA(Y ) = supxi,x′i,xS ,Y ln
P[y∈Y|xi,xS ]
P[y∈Y|x′
i
,xS ]
. The mechanism Y
satisfies ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy if supABDPLA(Y ) ≤ ǫ.
Semantic privacy (SP). Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] pro-
pose a Bayesian formulation of semantic privacy, inspired by the
following interpretation of differential privacy explained in [1]:
Regardless of external knowledge, an adversary with access to
the sanitized database draws the same conclusions whether or
not any individual data is included in the original database.
The phrases “external knowledge” and “drawing conclusions” are
formulated as follows in [3]. The external knowledge is modeled
by a prior probability distribution b on Dn, where b is short
for “belief”, and databases are assumed to be vectors in Dn for
some domain D. Conclusions are captured via the corresponding
posterior distribution: given a transcript y, the adversary updates
his belief b about the database x using Bayes’ rule to obtain a
posterior b: b[x|y] = P[Y (x)=y]b[x]∑
z P[Y (z)=y]b[z]
.
For the database x, Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] further
define x−i to be the same vector except that the record at position
i has been replaced by some fixed, default value ⊥ in D.
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] define n + 1 related games,
numbered 0 through n. In Game 0, the adversary interacts with
Y (x). This is the interaction that actually takes place between
the adversary and the randomized mechanism Y . Hence, the
distribution b0 is just the distribution b as defined in (1); i.e.,
b0[x|y] = b[x|y] =
P[Y (x)=y]b[x]∑
z
P[Y (z)=y]b[z] .
In Game i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), the adversary interacts with
Y (x−i). Game i describes the hypothetical scenario where person
i’s record is not used. In Game i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), given a
transcript y, the adversary updates his belief b about database
x again using Bayes’ rule to obtain a posterior bi as follows:
bi[x|y] =
P[Y (x−i)=y]b[x]∑
z P[Y (z−i)=y]b[z]
.
Given a transcript y, Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] say that
privacy has been breached if the adversary would draw different
conclusions about the world and, in particular, about a person
i, depending on whether or not i’s data was used. To this end,
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] formally define ǫ-semantic privacy
below, where the statistical difference SD(X,Y ) between random
variables X and Y on the same discrete space D is defined
by SD(X,Y ) = maxS⊆D
∣∣P [X ∈ S]−P [Y ∈ S] ∣∣. A randomized
mechanism Y is said to be ǫ-semantically private if for all belief
distributions b on Dn, for all possible transcripts y, and for all
i = 1, . . . , n, it holds that SD(b0[·|y], bi[·|y]) ≤ ǫ.
Membership privacy (MP). Li et al. [4] propose membership
privacy (MP) in consideration of the adversary’s prior beliefs. Let
the adversary’s prior beliefs about the dataset be captured by a
distribution D. From the adversary’s point of view, the dataset is
a random variable drawn according to the distribution D. With xi
denoting the event that record xi is not in the database, Li et al. [4]
define membership privacy as follows. A mechanism Y achieves
ǫ-membership privacy under a family D of distributions, i.e.,
〈D, ǫ〉-MP, if and only if for any distribution D ∈ D and for
any record xi, any possible set Y for the output, we have1
PD,Y [xi | Y] ≤ eǫPD[xi] and PD,Y [xi | Y] ≥ e−ǫPD[xi].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the results on the relations among several privacy notions:
differential privacy (DP), Bayesian differential privacy (BDP), se-
mantic privacy (SP), and membership privacy (MP). We elaborate
their proofs in Sections III. Section IV surveys related work, and
Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE RESULTS
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] introduce semantic privacy
(SP) and show its essential equivalence with differential privacy
(DP) in the quantitative sense (the notion of essential equivalence
means ǫ-DP ⇐= f(ǫ)-SP and ǫ-DP =⇒ g(ǫ)-SP for some
functions f and g). We extend their notion to Bayesian semantic
privacy (BSP) and show its essential equivalence with Bayesian
differential privacy (BDP) also in the quantitative sense. We prove
the relations between BDP, BSP, and SP as follows:
(i) ǫ-BDP ⇐=
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
-BSP.
(ii) ǫ-BDP =⇒ (e2ǫ − 1)-BSP =⇒ (e2ǫ − 1)-SP.
We prove results (i) and (ii) in Section III-A, where we also obtain
a minor result ǫ-DP ⇐=
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
-SP, which improves the
result of Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] stating ǫ-DP ⇐= ǫ/6-SP
for ǫ ≤ 1.35.
Li et al. [4] propose membership privacy (MP), which is
applicable to Bayesian data, in contrast to DP. However, no
general algorithm has been proposed for this framework. We
present the following relations between BDP and MP:
(iii) ǫ-BDP =⇒ ǫ-MP.
(iv) For a family of distributions that are downward scalable in
the sense of Li et al. [4], ǫ-BDP ⇐= ǫ-MP (See [4] for the
meaning of “downward scalable” distributions).
We prove results (iii) and (iv) in Section III-B.
1〈D, ǫ〉-membership privacy actually corresponds to 〈D, eǫ〉-positive member-
ship privacy in [4]. Li et al. [4] use γ and γ−1 instead of eǫ and e−ǫ in (21)
and (22) to define 〈D, γ〉-membership privacy. We use eǫ and e−ǫ here for better
comparison between membership privacy and Bayesian differential privacy. Also,
by membership privacy, we mean positive membership privacy of [4]. We do not
discuss negative membership privacy of [4].
III. PROOFS
A. Relations between our Bayesian differential privacy and Ka-
siviswanathan and Smith’s semantic privacy [3]
We extend the work of Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] on
semantic privacy to tackle the case of correlated tuples. Specif-
ically, we will present Bayesian semantic privacy and prove
that the notions of Bayesian differential privacy and Bayesian
semantic privacy are essentially (i.e., quantitatively) equivalent
(see Theorem 1 below). Our result resembles [3, Theorem 2.2],
which shows that differential privacy and semantic privacy are
essentially equivalent.
Theorem 1. ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy implies (e2ǫ − 1)-
Bayesian semantic privacy, and is implied by
(
1
2−
1
eǫ+1
)
-Bayesian
semantic privacy.
Theorem 2 (Improving the result of Kasiviswanathan and
Smith [3]). ǫ-Differential privacy implies (e2ǫ − 1)-semantic
privacy, and is implied by
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
-semantic privacy.
Theorem 1 is one of our novel results. The first part of
Theorem 2 is obtained by Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3]. The
second part of Theorem 2 improves the corresponding result of
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3], which states that ǫ-differential
privacy is implied by ǫ/6-semantic privacy for ǫ ≤ 1.35. The
improvement can be seen from 12 −
1
eǫ+1 > ǫ/6 for ǫ ≤ 1.35.
The rest of the discussion is organized as follows. We review
semantic privacy and define Bayesian semantic privacy in Section
III-A1. In Section III-A2, we recall Bayesian differential privacy.
Finally, we prove the above Theorem 1 in Section III-A3. The
proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1.
1) Reviewing semantic privacy and defining Bayesian semantic
privacy: In this section, we first review semantic privacy from
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3], before presenting Bayesian se-
mantic privacy, which extends the notion of semantic privacy to
address correlated tuples.
A review of Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] for semantic
privacy:
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] propose a Bayesian formula-
tion of semantic privacy, inspired by the following interpretation
of differential privacy explained in [1]: Regardless of external
knowledge, an adversary with access to the sanitized database
draws the same conclusions whether or not any individual data is
included in the original database. The phrases “external knowl-
edge” and “drawing conclusions” are formulated as follows in
[3]. The external knowledge is modeled by a prior probability
distribution b on Dn, where b is short for “belief,” and databases
are assumed to be vectors in Dn for some domain D. Conclusions
are captured via the corresponding posterior distribution: given a
transcript y, the adversary updates his belief b about the database
x using Bayes’ rule to obtain a posterior b:2
b[x|y] =
P [Y (x) = y] b[x]∑
z P [Y (z) = y] b[z]
. (1)
For the database x, Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] further
define x−i to be the same vector except that position i has been
replaced by some fixed, default value in D. Any valid value in
D will do for the default value. In addition, the default value can
be understood as a special value ⊥ (e.g., “no data”); see [3, Page
3–Footnote 2] for details. We will use ⊥ whenever it is necessary
to explicitly write out the default value.
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] define n + 1 related games,
numbered 0 through n. In Game 0, the adversary interacts with
Y (x). This is the interaction that actually takes place between
the adversary and the randomized mechanism Y . Hence, the
distribution b0 is just the distribution b as defined in (1); i.e.,
b0[x|y] = b[x|y] =
P [Y (x) = y] b[x]∑
z P [Y (z) = y] b[z]
. (2)
In Game i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), the adversary interacts with
Y (x−i). Game i describes the hypothetical scenario where person
i’s record is not used. In Game i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), given a transcript
y, the adversary updates his belief b about database x again using
Bayes’ rule to obtain a posterior bi as follows:
bi[x|y] =
P [Y (x−i) = y] b[x]∑
z P [Y (z−i) = y] b[z]
. (3)
Given a transcript y, Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] say
that privacy has been breached if the adversary would draw
different conclusions about the world and, in particular, about a
person i, depending on whether or not i’s data was used. To this
end, Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] formally define ǫ-semantic
privacy below, where the statistical difference SD(X,Y ) between
probability distributions (or random variables) X and Y on a
discrete space D is defined by
SD(X,Y ) = max
S⊆D
∣∣P [X ∈ S]− P [Y ∈ S] ∣∣.
Definition 1 (ǫ-Semantical Privacy by [3, Definition 2.1]). A
randomized mechanism Y is said to be ǫ-semantically private
if for all belief distributions b on Dn, for all possible transcripts
y, and for all i = 1, . . . , n:
SD(b0[·|y], bi[·|y]) ≤ ǫ. (4)
From (3) and (4), the above definition of ǫ-semantic privacy
requires the use of x−i, where x−i is obtained after we replace
position i at x by the default value ⊥. If the tuples are correlated,
changing position i at x might also result in changing other
positions at x. Hence, ǫ-semantic privacy may not work well under
correlated tuples. Given this, we next extend ǫ-semantic privacy to
address correlated tuples and present ǫ-Bayesian semantic privacy.
2For simplicity, only discrete probability distributions are discussed. The results
can be readily extended to the continuous case.
Extending semantic privacy to Bayesian semantic privacy
to address correlated tuples:
As will become clear, our extension of semantic privacy
to Bayesian semantic privacy is similar to the extension of
differential privacy to Bayesian differential privacy.
We let a statistical database be [X1, X2, . . . , Xn], where Xj
for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is a random variable. We also let N
be {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then we consider the databases x and z used
in (1)–(3) above to be
x = [X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xn = xn] = [Xj = xj : j ∈ N ],
(5)
and
z = [X1 = z1, X2 = z2, . . . , Xn = zn] = [Xj = zj : j ∈ N ].
(6)
When the data tuples are correlated, the adversary may
gain more advantage in inferring xi by using random vari-
ables Xj |j∈S’s instantiations xj |j∈S , and random variables
Xj|j∈N\{i}\S for computation instead of using instantiations
xj |j∈N\{i} only, where S ⊆ N \ {i} (note that S can be an
arbitrary subset of N \ {i}). For notation convenience, we define
xi+S and zi+S by
xi+S = [Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S],
(7)
and
zi+S = [Xi = zi, Xj = zj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S]. (8)
From (5)–(8), if S = N \ {i}, then xi+S and zi+S reduce to
databases x and z, respectively.
Similar to the previous subsection, here we also let the adver-
sary play n + 1 related games with the randomized mechanism
Y , and define b, b0, bi|i=1,...,n as detailed below. In Game 0, the
adversary interacts with Y (xi+S). We generalize x and z in (2)
to xi+S and zi+S , so that (2) becomes
b0[xi+S |y] = b[xi+S |y] =
P [Y (xi+S) = y] b[xi+S ]∑
zi+S
P [Y (zi+S) = y] b[zi+S ]
. (9)
For clarity, we explain the beliefs in (9). From (7) and (8), b[xi+S ]
and b[zi+S ] in (9) are given by
b[xi+S ] = b[Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S]
= b[Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S], (10)
and
b[zi+S ] = b[Xi = zi, Xj = zj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S]
= b[Xi = zi, Xj = zj : j ∈ S]. (11)
Similar to (10), from (7), b0[xi+S |y] is given by
b0[xi+S |y]
= b0[Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S|y]
= b0[Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S|y]. (12)
In Game i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), we change position i at xi+S to
the default value ⊥ to obtain x−i+S defined below; specifically,
recalling xi+S given by (7), we set x−i+S by
x−i+S = [Xi =⊥, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S].
(13)
Similarly, we change position i at zi+S to the default value ⊥ to
obtain z−i+S defined below; specifically, recalling zi+S given by
(8), we set z−i+S by
z−i+S = [Xi =⊥, Xj = zj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S].
(14)
As xi+S and zi+S generalize x and z in (3), clearly x−i+S and
z−i+S also generalize x−i and z−i in (3). In Game i (for 1 ≤ i ≤
n), the adversary interacts with Y (x−i+S ). Then replacing x, z,
x−i and z−i in (3) by xi+S , zi+S , x−i+S and z−i+S , respectively,
we obtain
bi[xi+S |y] =
P [Y (x−i+S ) = y] b[xi+S ]∑
zi+S
P [Y (z−i+S) = y] b[zi+S ]
. (15)
The beliefs b[xi+S ] and b[zi+S ] in (15) are already interpreted as
(10) and (11). For clarity, we further explain bi[xi+S |y] in (15).
Similar to (12), from (7), bi[xi+S |y] is given by
bi[xi+S |y]
= bi[Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S|y]
= bi[Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S|y]. (16)
With the above notation, we define ǫ-Bayesian semantical
privacy below, in a way similar to that of ǫ-semantical privacy
in Definition 1.
Definition 2 (ǫ-Bayesian Semantical Privacy). A randomized
mechanism Y is said to have ǫ-Bayesian semantical privacy if
for all belief distributions b on Dn, for all possible transcripts y,
for all i = 1, . . . , n, and for all xi+S and zi+S defined in (7) and
(8) with S ⊆ N \ {i}:
SD(b0[xi+S |y], bi[xi+S |y]) ≤ ǫ. (17)
To understand the beliefs b0[xi+S |y] and bi[xi+S |y] in (17),
we use their interpretations in (12) and (16). In Definition 2 for
ǫ-Bayesian semantical privacy, we consider all possible S ⊆ N \
{i}. In the hypothetical scenario where we consider S only as
N \ {i} in Definition 2, Definition 2 would reduce to Definition
1 for ǫ-semantical privacy.
2) Recalling Bayesian differential privacy: In this section, we
recall Bayesian differential privacy and express its definition using
some new notation.
With xi+S defined in (7) (i.e., xi+S = [Xi = xi, Xj = xj :
j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S]), for notation convenience, we
further define x′i+S by
x′i+S = [Xi = x
′
i, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S].
(18)
Note that the only difference between xi+S and x
′
i+S is that the
former has Xi = xi, while the latter enforces Xi = x
′
i. Then
ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy means
P [Y (xi+S) = y]
P
[
Y (x′i+S) = y
] ≤ eǫ. (19)
3) Proving Theorem 1 on the relations between Bayesian
differential privacy and Bayesian semantic privacy: Our
Theorem 1 restated below presents the relations between
Bayesian differential privacy and Bayesian semantic privacy.
Theorem 1 (Restated). ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy
implies (e2ǫ − 1)-Bayesian semantic privacy, and is implied by(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
-Bayesian semantic privacy.
Theorem 1 shows that the notions of Bayesian differential
privacy and Bayesian semantic privacy are essentially equivalent
(of course, the parameters should be set appropriately). The
proof of Theorem 1 below is just an extension of the reasoning
by Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3].
Proof of Theorem 1. We show Theorem 1 in two parts
below. We will use the following definition of point-wise (ǫ, 0)-
indistinguishability from [3, Definition 3.2]: Two discrete random
variables X and Y are point-wise (ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable if it
holds for a drawn from either X or Y that e−ǫP [Y = a] ≤
P [X = a] ≤ eǫP [Y = a].
Proving ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy=⇒ (e2ǫ−1)-Bayesian
semantic privacy: To prove this part, we consider any database
x ∈ Dn. Let Y be an ǫ/2-Bayesian differentially private al-
gorithm. Consider any belief distribution b. Let the posterior
distributions b0[xi+S |y] and bi[xi+S |y] for some fixed i, S and
y be defined in (9) and (15). From (19), ǫ-Bayesian differential
privacy implies that for every zi+S ,
e−ǫP [Y (z−i+S) = y] ≤ P [Y (zi+S) = y] ≤ e
ǫ
P [Y (z−i+S) = y] .
These inequalities imply that the ratio of b0[xi+S |y] and
bi[xi+S |y] (defined in (9) and (15)) is within e±2ǫ. Since these
inequalities hold for every xi+S , we get:
e−2ǫbi[xi+S |y] ≤ b0[xi+S |y] ≤ e
2ǫbi[xi+S |y], ∀xi+S .
This implies that the random variables b0[xi+S |y] and bi[xi+S |y]
are point-wise (2ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable. Applying [3, Lemma 3.3-
Property 5], we obtain SD(b0[xi+S |y], bi[xi+S |y]) ≤ (e
2ǫ − 1).
Repeating the above arguments for every belief distribution, for
every i, and for every y, we thus show that the mechanism Y is
(e2ǫ − 1)-Bayesian semantic private.
Proving
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
-Bayesian semantic privacy =⇒
ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy: To prove this part, we consider
a belief distribution b which is uniform over
xi+S = [Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S]
and
x′i+S = [Xi = x
′
i, Xj = xj : j ∈ S, Xj : j ∈ N \ {i} \ S];
i.e.,
b[xi+S ] = b[Xi = xi, Xj = xj : j ∈ S] =
1
2
and
b[x′i+S ] = b[Xi = x
′
i, Xj = xj : j ∈ S] =
1
2
.
Fix a transcript y. The distribution bi[·|y] will be uniform over
xi+S and x
′
i+S since they induce the same distribution on tran-
scripts in Game i. This means that b0[·|y] will assign probabilities
in the interval [ 12 −
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
, 12 +
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
] to each of xi+S
and x′i+S (by Definition 1). Working through Bayes’ rule shows
that (note that b[xi+S ] = b[x
′
i+S ])
P [Y (xi+S ) = y]
P
[
Y (x′i+S ) = y
]
=
b0[xi+S |y]
b0[x′i+S |y]
≤
1
2 +
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
1
2 −
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
) = eǫ. (20)
Since the bound in (20) holds for every y, Y (xi+S) and Y (x
′
i+S)
are point-wise (ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable. From [3, Lemma 3.3-
Property 5], Y (xi+S) and Y (x
′
i+S ) are (ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable.
Since this relation holds for every pair of xi+S and x
′
i+S , the
mechanism Y is ǫ-Bayesian differentially private.
B. Relations between Bayesian differential privacy and member-
ship privacy
The adversary may have prior beliefs about what the dataset
is; this is captured by a distribution D. From the adversary’s point
of view, the dataset is a random variable drawn according to the
distribution D. With xi denoting the event that record xi is not in
the database, Li et al. [4] define membership privacy as follows,
where we reuse some notation of Li et al. [4].
Definition 3 (Li et al. [4]). A mechanism Y achieves
ǫ-membership privacy under a family D of distributions, i.e.,
〈D, ǫ〉-membership privacy, if and only if for any distribution
D ∈ D and for any record xi, any possible set Y for the output,
we have3
PD,Y [xi | Y] ≤ e
ǫ
PD[xi] (21)
and
PD,Y [xi | Y] ≥ e
−ǫ
PD[xi]. (22)
3〈D, ǫ〉-membership privacy actually corresponds to 〈D, eǫ〉-membership pri-
vacy in [4]. Li et al. [4] use γ and γ−1 instead of eǫ and e−ǫ in (21) and (22) to
define 〈D, γ〉-membership privacy. We use eǫ and e−ǫ here for better comparison
between membership privacy and Bayesian differential privacy.
We discuss the adversary model considered here. Let Di,K
denote a distribution where P [xi, xK ] = p and P [x
′
i, xK ] = 1−p
for some p. Define D∗
def
= ∪i∈{1,...,n},
K⊆{1,...,n}\{i}
Di,K . The adversary
model will be captured by the family D∗ of distributions. For
simplicity, we will refer to 〈D∗, ǫ〉-membership privacy as ǫ-
membership privacy.
1) From Bayesian differential privacy to membership privacy:
Theorem 3. ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy implies ǫ-membership
privacy.
Lemma 1. A mechanism Y achieves ǫ-membership privacy under
a family D of distributions, i.e., 〈D, ǫ〉-MP, if and only if it holds
for any distribution D ∈ D that4
PD,Y [Y | xi]
PD,Y [Y | xi]
≤


1− PD[xi]
e−ǫ − PD[xi]
, if 0 ≤ PD[xi] ≤
1
1+eǫ ,(23a)
eǫ − 1 + PD[xi]
PD[xi]
, if 11+eǫ < PD[xi] ≤ 1.(23b)
We will explain that Lemma 1 implies the following corollary,
which will be used to show Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. A mechanism Y achieves ǫ-membership privacy
under a family D of distributions, i.e., 〈D, ǫ〉-MP, if it holds for
any distribution D ∈ D that
PD,Y [Y|xi]
PD,Y [Y|xi]
≤ eǫ.
Proof of Theorem 3 using Corollary 1. Under distribution Di,K
where P [xi, xK ] = p and P [x
′
i, xK ] = 1−p for some p, we have
PDi,K ,Y [Y | xi] = P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) ∈ Y
]
, (24)
and
PDi,K ,Y [Y | xi] = P
[
Y (x′i, xK , XK) ∈ Y
]
. (25)
Under ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy, we have
P
[
Y (xi,xK ,XK)∈Y
]
P
[
Y (x′
i
,xK ,XK)∈Y
]
≤ eǫ, which along with (24) and (25) yields
PDi,K,Y
[Y|xi]
PDi,K,Y
[Y|xi]
≤
eǫ, then 〈D∗, ǫ〉-membership privacy (i.e., ǫ-membership privacy)
follows for D∗
def
= ∪i∈{1,...,n},
K⊆{1,...,n}\{i}
Di,K .
Proof of Corollary 1 using Lemma 1. Note that (23a) and (23b)
in Lemma 1 can be written as
PD,Y [Y|xi]
PD,Y [Y|xi]
≤ g
(
PD[xi]
)
, where g(b)
is a function defined as follows:
g(b)
def
=


1−b
e−ǫ−b , if 0 ≤ b ≤
1
1+eǫ ,
eǫ−1+b
b
, if 11+eǫ < b ≤ 1.
(26)
The function g(b) increases as b increases for 0 ≤ b ≤ 11+eǫ
and decreases as b increases for 11+eǫ < b ≤ 1. Hence, at b =
0 or b = 1, g(b) takes its minimum g(0) = g(1) = eǫ. Then
PD,Y [Y|xi]
PD,Y [Y|xi]
≤ eǫ implies PD,Y [Y|xi]
PD,Y [Y|xi]
≤ g
(
PD[xi]
)
for any PD[xi].
In view this, we obtain Corollary 1 from Lemma 1.
4We let 0
0
= 1 and non-zero
0
=∞ to address the degenerate cases.
Proof of Lemma 1. For simplicity, we define
A
def
=
PD,Y [Y | xi]
PD,Y [Y | xi]
, (27)
Then the goal of Lemma 1 is to show the combination of (21)
and (22) is equivalent to A ≤ g
(
PD[xi]
)
. Hence, we will establish
Lemma 1 once proving the following three results:
(21)⇐⇒
{
1− PD[xi] ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − PD[xi]
)}
, (28)
(22)⇐⇒
{
A× PD[xi] + 1− PD[xi] ≤ e
ǫ
}
, (29)
and
1− PD[xi] ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − PD[xi]
)
,
and A× PD[xi] + 1− PD[xi] ≤ e
ǫ
}
⇐⇒ A ≤ g
(
PD[xi]
)
.
(30)
Below we demonstrate (28) (29) and (30), respectively.
Proving (28):
By Bayes’ theorem, it holds that
PD,Y [xi | Y] =
PD,Y [Y | xi]PD[xi]
PD,Y [Y]
. (31)
Given (31), we have
(21)⇐⇒ PD,Y [Y | xi] ≤ e
ǫ × PD,Y [Y]. (32)
To prove (32), we express PD,Y [Y] by the law of total probability,
and find
PD,Y [Y] = PD,Y [Y | xi]PD[xi] + PD,Y [Y | xi]PD[xi]. (33)
Applying (27) to (33), we obtain
PD,Y [Y] = PD,Y [Y | xi]×
{
PD[xi] +A
−1 × PD[xi]
}
. (34)
Then it follows from (32) and (34) that
(21)⇐⇒ PD[xi] +A
−1 × PD[xi] ≥ e
−ǫ
⇐⇒ 1− PD[xi] ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − PD[xi]
)
;
i.e., (28) is established.
Proving (29):
By Bayes’ theorem, it holds that
PD,Y [xi | Y] =
PD,Y [Y | xi]PD[xi]
PD,Y [Y]
. (35)
Given (35), we have
(22)⇐⇒PD,Y [Y | xi] ≥ e
−ǫ × PD,Y [Y (X ) 6= y]. (36)
We recall (34). Applying (27) to (34), we obtain
PD,Y [Y]
= A× PD,Y [Y | xi]×
{
PD[xi] +A
−1 × PD[xi]
}
. (37)
Then it follows from (36) and (37) that
(22)⇐⇒ A×
{
PD[xi] +A
−1 × PD [xi]
}
≤ eǫ
⇐⇒ A× PD[xi] + 1− PD[xi] ≤ e
ǫ;
i.e., (29) is established.
Proving (30):
With PD[xi] replaced by real x ∈ [0, 1], (30) will follow once
we show for x ∈ [0, 1] that
1− x ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − x
)
,
and A× x+ 1− x ≤ eǫ
}
⇐⇒ A ≤ g(x). (38)
We first prove the “=⇒” part in (38). If 0 ≤ x < e−ǫ, we
obtain from 1− x ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − x
)
that A ≤ 1−x
e−ǫ−x . If 0 < x ≤ 1,
we obtain from A×x+1−x ≤ eǫ that A ≤ e
ǫ−1+x
x
. With g1(x)
denoting 1−x
e−ǫ−x for 0 ≤ x < e
−ǫ and g2(x) denoting
eǫ−1+x
x
for
0 < x ≤ 1, we see that g(x) equals g1(x) if 0 ≤ x ≤
1
1+eǫ , and
equals g2(x) if
1
1+eǫ < x ≤ 1. Given the above, if 0 ≤ x ≤
1
1+eǫ ,
we have A ≤ g1(x) = g(x), and if
1
1+eǫ < x ≤ 1, we have
A ≤ g2(x) = g(x). Hence, the “=⇒” part in (38) immediately
follows.
We then prove the “⇐=” part in (38). For any x ∈ [0, 1], we
will establish i) 1−x ≥ A
(
e−ǫ−x
)
, and ii) A×x+1−x ≤ eǫ,
respectively. We still use g1(x) and g2(x) defined above. Note that
g1(x) is only defined for 0 ≤ x < e−ǫ and g2(x) is only defined
for 0 < x ≤ 1. It is straightforward to show g1(x) ≤ g2(x) if
0 < x ≤ 11+eǫ , and g1(x) ≥ g2(x) if
1
1+eǫ < x < e
−ǫ.
i) If 0 ≤ x ≤ 11+eǫ , we obtain from A ≤ g(x) = g1(x) that
A ≤ 1−x
e−ǫ−x , implying 1 − x ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − x
)
. If 11+eǫ <
x < e−ǫ, we obtain from A ≤ g(x) = g2(x) ≤ g1(x) that
A ≤ 1−x
e−ǫ−x , yielding 1− x ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − x
)
. If e−ǫ ≤ x ≤ 1,
it holds that 1 − x ≥ 0 ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − x
)
. To summarize, for
any x ∈ [0, 1], it follows that 1− x ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − x
)
.
ii) If 11+eǫ < x ≤ 1, we obtain from A ≤ g(x) = g2(x) that
A ≤ e
ǫ−1+x
x
, implying A × x + 1 − x ≤ eǫ. If 0 < x ≤
1
1+eǫ , we obtain from A ≤ g(x) = g1(x) ≤ g2(x) that
A ≤ e
ǫ−1+x
x
, yielding A × x + 1 − x ≤ eǫ. If x = 0,
we have A × x + 1 − x = 1 ≤ eǫ. To summarize, for any
x ∈ [0, 1], it follows that 1− x ≥ A
(
e−ǫ − x
)
.
(38) is proved since its “=⇒” and “⇐=” both hold.
2) From membership privacy to Bayesian differential privacy:
Theorem 4. For a family of distributions that are downward
scalable in the sense of Li et al. [4], ǫ-membership privacy implies
ǫ-Bayesian differential privacy.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is similar to that of [4, Theorem
3.6]. For completeness, we still present the details below.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that mechanism Y
achieves ǫ-membership privacy yet does not satisfy ǫ-Bayesian
differential privacy. Then there exists a distribution D and entity
xi such that 0 < PD[xi] < 1 and PD,Y [Y | xi] > eǫPD,Y [Y | xi].
We discuss two cases below.
Case one: PD,Y [Y | xi] = 0 and PD,Y [Y | xi] > 0. Since D is
downward scalable, by definition D contains some D′ which is xi-
scaled from D such that PD′ [xi] < e
−ǫ. From [4, Lemma 3.4], we
have PD′,Y [Y | xi] = PD,Y [Y | xi], which with the case condi-
tion PD,Y [Y | xi] = 0 means PD′,Y [Y | xi] = 0, further yielding
PD′,Y [xi | Y] = 1. Therefore, PD′,Y [xi | Y] = 1 > eǫPD′ [xi],
which contradicts the fact that Y achieves ǫ-membership privacy.
Case two: PD,Y [Y | xi] = αPD,Y [Y | xi], where α > eǫ.
Since D is downward scalable, by definition D contains some D′
which is xi-scaled from D such that PD′ [xi] = q for an arbitrarily
small q (see [4] for the meaning of “*-scaled”). From [4, Lemma
3.4], we have PD′,Y [Y | xi] = PD,Y [Y | xi] and PD′,Y [Y | xi] =
PD,Y [Y | xi]. These with the case condition PD,Y [Y | xi] =
αPD,Y [Y | xi] gives PD′,Y [Y | xi] = αPD′,Y [Y | xi]. Then,
under D′, we have
PD′,Y [xi | Y]
PD′[xi]
=
PD′,Y [Y | xi]
PD′,Y [Y]
=
PD′,Y [Y | xi]
PD′,Y [Y | xi]PD′ [xi] + PD′,Y [Y | xi]PD′ [xi]
=
αPD′,Y [Y | xi]
αPD′,Y [Y | xi] · q + PD′,Y [Y | xi] · (1− q)
=
α
αq + 1− q
. (39)
The above ratio α
αq+1−q is greater than e
ǫ given α > eǫ, once we
ensure q < α−e
ǫ
eǫ(α−1) . This will give PD′,Y [xi | Y] > e
ǫ
PD′ [xi],
which contradicts the fact that Y achieves ǫ-membership privacy.
Summarizing the above two cases, we have proved the desired
result.
IV. RELATED WORK
The notion of differential privacy (DP) [1], [5] provides a
rigorous foundation for privacy protection. Intuitively, DP implies
that changing one entry in the database does not significantly
change the query output, so that an adversary, seeing the query
output and knowing all records except the one to be inferred,
draws almost the same conclusion on whether or not a record
is in the database. Differential privacy has received consider-
able interest in the literature [17]–[26]. Yang et al. [2] and
Liu et al. [27] propose Bayesian differential privacy and de-
pendent differential privacy respectively to generalize differential
privacy for correlated data. Kasiviswanathan and Smith [3] pro-
pose a Bayesian formulation of semantic privacy, inspired by the
following interpretation of differential privacy explained in [1]:
Regardless of external knowledge, an adversary with access to the
sanitized database draws the same conclusions whether or not any
individual data is included in the original database. To present
the notion of semantic privacy, Kasiviswanathan and Smith model
the external knowledge via a prior probability distribution, and
model conclusions via the corresponding posterior distribution.
Li et al. [4] introduce membership privacy (MP) in consideration
of the adversary’s prior beliefs.
Dwork and Rothblum [28] recently proposed the notion of
concentrated differential privacy, a relaxation of differential pri-
vacy achieving better accuracy than differential privacy without
compromising on cumulative privacy cost over multiple com-
putations. Motivated by [28], Bun and Steinke [29] suggest a
relaxation of concentrated differential privacy. Instead of treating
the privacy loss as a subgaussian random variable as [28] does,
Bun and Steinke [29] instead formulate the problem in terms of
Renyi entropy, giving a relaxation of concentrated differential
privacy. Jorgensen et al. [30] introduce a new privacy defini-
tion called personalized differential privacy, a generalization of
differential privacy in which users specify a personal privacy
level for their data. They show that by accepting that not all
users demand the same level of privacy, a higher level of utility
can often be obtained by not providing excess privacy budget
to those who do not need it. They present a mechanism for
achieving personalized differential privacy, inspired by the well-
known exponential mechanism of differential privacy. Hall et
al. [31] introduce additional randomness to extend differential
privacy to the notion of random differential privacy. Compared
with differential privacy, Lee and Clifton [32] give an alter-
nate formulation, differential identifiability, parameterized by the
probability of individual identification. Their notion provides the
strong privacy guarantees of differential privacy, while allowing
policy makers to set parameters based on the privacy concept of
individual identifiability.
Bohli and Andreas [33] discuss the relations among several
privacy definitions, but the discussion does not cover differ-
ential privacy. Li et al. [34] present the relation between k-
anonymization and differential privacy, where the k-anonymity
notion by [35], [36] means that when only quasi-identifiers are
considered, each record in a k-anonymized dataset should appear
at least k times. Wang et al. [37] analyze the relation between
differential privacy, mutual-information privacy, and identifiabil-
ity. Mironov et al. [38] present several relaxations of differential
privacy by requiring privacy guarantees to hold only against com-
putationally bounded adversaries. They establish various relations
among these notions, and show that the notions exhibit close
connection with the theory of pseudodense sets [39].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a comprehensive view of the
relations among different privacy notions: differential privacy
(DP), Bayesian differential privacy (BDP), semantic privacy (SP),
and membership privacy (MP). In particular, we extend the notion
of semantic privacy (SP) to Bayesian semantic privacy (BSP) and
prove its essential equivalence with Bayesian differential privacy
(BDP) in the quantitative sense. We show the relations between
BDP, BSP, and SP as follows: ǫ-BDP ⇐=
(
1
2 −
1
eǫ+1
)
-BSP,
and ǫ-BDP =⇒ (e2ǫ − 1)-BSP =⇒ (e2ǫ − 1)-SP. Moreover,
we derive the following relations between BDP and
MP. First, ǫ-BDP =⇒ ǫ-MP. Second, For a family of
distributions that are downward scalable in the sense of
Li et al. [4], it holds that ǫ-BDP ⇐= ǫ-MP.
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